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Dominant Search Engines: 
An Essential Cultural 
& Political Facility 
By Frank Pasquale* 
Many worry about search engines’ growing power.  How are worldviews being 
biased by them?  Do search engines have an interest in getting certain 
information prioritized or occluded?1  Dominant search engines (“DSEs”)2 are a 
key hub of Internet traffic.  They provide an ever-expanding array of services.  
Google, for instance, just announced its intention to go into travel shopping. As 
they amass information about their users, calls for regulation have focused on 
the threats to privacy they generate.  Some of these efforts have been successful; 
others look more doubtful.  One thing is certain: They are only the beginning of 
a struggle over the rights and responsibilities of key intermediaries.  Some hope 
that competition law—and particularly the doctrine of “essential facilities”—will 
lead policymakers to scrutinize search engines actions. 
When American lawyers talk about “essential facilities,” they are referring to 
antitrust doctrine that has tried, at various points, to make certain “bottlenecks” 
in the economy provide access on fair and nondiscriminatory terms to all 
comers.  As robust American competition law fades into a secluded corner of 
legal history,3 “essential facilities” doctrine still remains, for some scholars, a ray 
of hope for intermediary responsibility.4  Oren Bracha and I helped fuel this 
                                                     
* Professor of  Law, Seton Hall Law School; Visiting Fellow, Princeton Center for Information 
Technology Policy. 
1 ALEX HALAVAIS, SEARCH ENGINE SOCIETY 85 (Polity 2008) (“In the process of  ranking 
results, search engines effectively create winners and losers on the web as a whole.  Now that 
search engines are moving into other realms, this often opaque technology of  ranking 
becomes kingmaker in new venues.”); Chi-Chu Tschang, The Squeeze at China’s Baidu, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2008, at 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_02/b4115021710265.htm (“Salespeople 
working for Baidu drop sites from results to bully companies into buying sponsored links [a 
form of  paid advertising], say some who have been approached.”).   
2 We can provisionally define a dominant search engine (“DSE”) as one with more than 40 
percent market share.  Google clearly satisfies this criterion in the United States and Europe.  
See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 285 (2008) (reporting market shares for leading internet intermediaries).   
3 BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF 
DESTRUCTION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010) (describing the declining impact of  American 
antitrust law).   
4 Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 
2 (2008) (“infrastructure subject to substantial access and nondiscrimination norms [has] … 
been heavily regulated.”). 
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hope in our 2008 article Federal Search Commission, which compared dominant 
search engines to railroads and common carriers in the hope that they would be 
recognized as infrastructural foundations of the information economy.5  But I 
now see that Federal Search Commission, like many other parts of the search engine 
accountability literature, tried too hard to shoehorn a wide variety of social 
concerns about search engines into the economic language of antitrust policy.6  
It is now time for scholars and activists to move beyond the crabbed vocabulary 
of competition law to develop a richer normative critique of search engine 
dominance. 
This will not be an easy sell in cyberlaw, which tends to uncritically promote 
competition and innovation as the highest aims of Internet policy.  If a 
dominant search engine is abusing its position, market-oriented scholars say, 
market forces will usually solve the problem, and antitrust law can step in when 
they fail to do so.  Even those who favor net neutrality rules for carriers are 
wary of applying them to other intermediaries, like search engines.  All tend to 
assume that the more “innovation” happens on the Internet, the more choices 
users will have and the more efficient the market will become.   Yet these 
scholars have not paid enough attention to the kind of innovation that is best 
for society, and whether the uncoordinated preferences of millions of web users 
for low-cost convenience are likely to address the cultural and political concerns 
that dominant search engines raise. 
In this article, I hope to demonstrate two points.   First, antitrust law terms (like 
“essential facility”) cannot hope to capture the complexity of concerns raised by 
an information landscape where one company serves as the predominant map 
of the web, and simultaneously attempts to exploit that dominance by endlessly 
expanding into adjoining fields.  Second, I hope to point the way toward a new 
concept of “essential cultural and political facility,” which can help policymakers 
realize the situations where a bottleneck has become important enough that 
special scrutiny is warranted.  This scrutiny may not always lead to regulation—
which the First Amendment renders a dicey enterprise in any corner of the 
information economy.  However, it could lead us to recognize the importance 
of publicly funded alternatives to the concentrated conduits and content-
providers colonizing the web.   
  
                                                     
5 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Fairness, Access, and Accountability in 
the Law of  Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1193 (2008). 
6 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) (“Almost everyone professionally 
involved in antitrust today—whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed 
observer—not only agrees that the only goal of  the antitrust laws should be to promote 
economic welfare, but also agrees on the essential tenets of  economic theory that should be 
used to determine the consistency of  specific business practices with that goal.”). 
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The Limits of Antitrust as Search Policy 
Antitrust cases tend to consume a great deal of time, in part because economic 
conduct is subject to many different interpretations.7  One person’s 
anticompetitive conduct is another’s effective business strategy.  The same 
unending (and indeterminate) arguments threaten to stall discourse on search 
policy.  For example, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) review of the 
Google–DoubleClick merger focused almost entirely on the economic effects 
of the proposed combination, rather than the threats to privacy it posed.8 
Search engines are among the most innovative services in the global economy.  
They provide extraordinary efficiencies for advertisers and consumers by 
targeting messages to viewers who are most likely to want to receive them.  In 
order to attract more users, search engines use revenues from advertising to 
organize and index a great deal of content on the Internet.  Like the major 
broadcast networks, search engines are now beginning to displace. They provide 
opportunities to view content (organic search results) in order to sell advertising 
(paid search results).9  Search engines have provoked antitrust scrutiny because 
proposed deals between major search engines (and between search engines and 
content providers) suggest undue coordination of competitors in an already 
concentrated industry.10 
                                                     
7 See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the Problem that It Can’t 
Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (1999) (“The main concern in finding a remedy 
for [‘bad monopolist behaviors’] may be time: The technology environment moves at a 
lightning pace, and by the time a federal case has been made out of  a problem, the problem 
is proven, a remedy fashioned, and appeals exhausted, the damage may already be 
irreversible.”). 
8 News Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Closes Google/DoubleClick Investigation 
(Dec. 20, 2007), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/googledc.shtm (“The Commissioners 
... wrote that ‘as the sole purpose of  federal antitrust review of  mergers and acquisitions is 
to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition,’ the FTC lacks the legal authority 
to block the transaction on grounds, or require conditions to this transaction, that do not 
relate to antitrust.  Adding, however, that it takes consumer privacy issues very seriously, the 
Commission cross-referenced its release of  a set of  proposed behavioral marketing 
principles that were also announced today.”). 
9 According to the Google corporate home page, “[W]e distinguish ads from search results or 
other content on a page by labeling them as ‘sponsored links’ or ‘Ads by Google.’  We don’t 
sell ad placement in our search results, nor do we allow people to pay for a higher ranking 
there.”  Google, Inc., Corporate Information: Company Overview, 
www.google.com/corporate/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). 
10 For example, the deal reached between Microsoft and Yahoo! that would have Microsoft’s 
Bing search engine deliver results for searches on Yahoo! has provoked antitrust concerns 
both domestically and internationally.  See Christopher S. Rugaber, Microsoft–Yahoo Deal to Face 
Tough Antitrust Probe, ABCNEWS, July 29, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009563654_apusmicrosoftyaho
oantitrust.html.   
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Those opposed to regulation often claim that antitrust law offers a more 
targeted and efficient response to abuses.  As Justice Breyer explained in his 
classic work Regulation and Its Reform: 
[T]he antitrust laws differ from classical regulation both in their 
aims and in their methods … .  [T]hey act negatively, through a 
few highly general provisions prohibiting certain forms of private 
conduct.  They do not affirmatively order firms to behave in 
specified ways; for the most part, they tell private firms what 
not to do … .  Only rarely do the antitrust enforcement 
agencies create the detailed web of affirmative legal obligations 
that characterizes classical regulation.11 
Given the lack of search engine regulation in the U.S., actual and threatened 
antitrust investigations have been a primary government influence on Google’s 
business practices as its dominance in search grows.  Many believe that the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) suspicion of the company’s proposed joint 
venture with Yahoo! in the search advertising field effectively scuttled the deal 
by late 2008.12  However, antitrust enforcement appears less promising in other 
aspects of search.13  This section discusses the limits of antitrust in addressing 
the cultural and political dilemmas raised by Google’s proposed Book Search 
deal with publishers,14 and its dominance of online advertising. 
                                                     
11 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156–57 (Harvard Univ. Press 1982).  But 
see A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13 (1995) 
(describing “two paradigms,” the law enforcement model and the regulatory model, and the 
shift of  antitrust law from the former to the latter). 
12 Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, The Plot to Kill Google, WIRED, Jan. 19, 2009, at 88, 
available at www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-02/ff_killgoogle (noting that antitrust 
scrutiny culminated in a hearing in which the DOJ threatened to bring an antitrust case 
against Google and that one prominent DOJ attorney expressed the view that Google 
already is a monopoly).  
13 Daniel Rubinfeld, Foundations of  Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. 
ANTITRUST 51, 57 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (describing how “conservative economics has 
fostered a tendency to downplay enforcement in dynamic technological industries in which 
innovation issues play a significant role”).  
14 Despite the DOJ’s intervention to affect the terms of  the proposed settlement, many leading 
antitrust experts have argued that the settlement would not violate the antitrust laws.  See, e.g., 
Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement Is Pro-Competitive 58 (Harvard Law Sch., Law & 
Econ. Discussion Paper No. 646, Harvard Law Sch., Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper 
No. 09-45, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1459028 (“The settlement does 
not raise rival barriers to offering [many] books, but to the contrary lowers them.  The 
output expansion is particularly dramatic for out-of-print books, for which there is currently 
no new output at all.”).   
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Privacy concerns are nearly impossible to address within the economic models 
of contemporary competition law.  Antitrust scrutiny did little to address the 
privacy concerns raised when Google proposed to merge with the web 
advertising firm DoubleClick.15  The proposed deal provoked a complaint from 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). EPIC claimed that Google’s 
modus operandi amounts to a “deceptive trade practice”: 
Upon arriving at the Google homepage, a Google user is not 
informed of Google’s data collection practices until he or she 
clicks through four links.  Most users will not reach this page 
… .  Google collects user search terms in connection with his 
or her IP address without adequate notice to the user.  
Therefore, Google’s representations concerning its data 
retention practices were, and are, deceptive practices.16 
One key question raised by the proposed merger was whether privacy and 
consumer protection concerns like these can be addressed by traditional 
antitrust analysis.17  Privacy law expert Peter Swire argued that they can, because 
“privacy harms reduce consumer welfare … [and] lead to a reduction in the 
quality of a good or service.”18  Swire believed that consumers would be worse 
off after the merger because of the unparalleled digital dossiers the combined 
entity could generate:  
Google often has “deep” information about an individual’s 
actions, such as detailed information about search terms.  
Currently, DoubleClick sets one or more cookies on an 
individual’s computers, and receives detailed information about 
which sites the person visits while surfing.  DoubleClick has 
                                                     
15 Dawn Kawamoto & Anne Broache, FTC Allows Google–DoubleClick Merger to Proceed, CNET 
NEWS, Dec. 20, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/FTC-allows-Google-DoubleClick-
merger-to-proceed/2100-1024_3-6223631.html (describing U.S. authorities’ blessing of  the 
proposed deal).     
16 See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, In 
re Google Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc., No. 071-0170 (FTC Apr. 20, 2007), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_complaint.pdf at 9 [hereinafter Google, Inc. 
and DoubleClick Complaint]. 
17 See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of  Everything, Google and DoubleClick: A 
Bigger Antitrust Problem than I Had Imagined, 
www.googlizationofeverything.com/2007/10/google_and_doubleclick_a_bigge.php (Oct. 
21, 2007, 16:05 EST).  
18 Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
Oct. 19, 2007, www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/10/privacy.html (italics omitted). 
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“broad” information about an individual’s actions, with its 
leading ability to pinpoint where a person surfs.19 
Initial points of contention include (a) the definition of the products at issue, 
and (b) how to weigh the costs and benefits of a merger.  The combined 
company would have different segments of “customers” in a two-sided 
market:20 (1) searchers trying to find sites, and (2) ad buyers trying to reach 
searchers.  Swire contends that many people care about privacy, and “[i]t would 
be illogical to count the harms to consumers from higher prices while excluding 
the harms from privacy invasions—both sorts of harms reduce consumer 
surplus and consumer welfare in the relevant market.”21 
However, the web searcher category not only consists of consumers who care 
about privacy, but also includes many people who do not highly value it or who 
actively seek to expose their information in order to receive more targeted 
solicitations.  According to Eric Goldman’s work on personalized search, some 
may even consider the gathering of data about them to be a service.22  The more 
information is gathered about them, the better intermediaries are able to serve 
them relevant ads.  Many economic models of web publication assume that 
users “pay” for content by viewing ads;23 they may effectively pay less if the 
advertisements they view bear some relation to things they want to buy.  So 
while Swire models advertising and data collection as a cost to be endured, 
                                                     
19 Id.  According to Swire, “[i]f  the merger is approved, then individuals using the market 
leader in search may face a search product that has both ‘deep’ and ‘broad’ collection of  
information.  For the many millions of  individuals with high privacy preferences, this may be 
a significant reduction in the quality of  the search product—search previously was 
conducted without the combined deep and broad tracking, and now the combination will 
exist.”  Id.  
20 For a definition of  two-sided market, see Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, Net Neutrality 
on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market Analysis 1 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 07-45, N.Y. Univ. 
Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 07-40, 2007), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019121 (“[P]latforms sell 
Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers 
‘on the other side’ of  the Internet.”).  In the search engine context, consumers “pay” by 
attending to ads, and ad-purchasers pay Google for the chance to get ad viewers’ attention. 
21 Swire, supra note 18. 
22 Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of  Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1162–64 (“Three 
components determine an individual consumer’s utility from a marketing exposure: (1) the 
consumer’s substantive interest in the marketing, (2) the consumer’s nonsubstantive reactions 
to the marketing exposure, and (3) the attention consumed by evaluating and sorting the 
marketing. …  [A] consumer may derive utility from the rote act of  being contacted by 
marketers or exposed to the marketing, regardless of  the marketing content.”).   
23 David S. Evans, The Economics of  the Online Advertising Industry, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 359, 
359 (2008), available at www.bepress.com/rne/vol7/iss3/2 (describing how many of  the top 
websites have adopted the “free-tv” model where the publisher generates traffic by not 
charging for readers but then sell that traffic to advertisers). 
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Google and DoubleClick argue that  the resulting personalized ads serve 
customers.  Their arguments prevailed, and Google officially acquired 
DoubleClick in 2008.24 
Antitrust law is ill prepared to handle a “market” where some percentage of 
consumers consider loss of privacy a gain and others consider it a loss.  
Economic reasoning in general falters in the face of externalities, but usually we 
can all agree that, say, pollution is a harm (or negative externality) and flowers 
are a boon (or positive externality).  Privacy preferences are much more 
idiosyncratic.  
Critics of the merger do have a response to this problem of diverse 
preferences—they can shift from characterizing lost privacy as a cost of web 
searching to describing it as a reduction in the quality of the services offered by 
the merging entities.25  Douglas Kysar’s work on the product–process 
distinction is encouraging here.  Kysar has claimed that consumers should have 
a right to make choices of products based on how the products are made, not 
just how well they work.26  Kysar argues “in favor of acknowledging and 
accommodating [consumer] process preferences within policy analysis, given 
the potential significance that such preferences may serve in the future as 
outlets for public-minded behavior.”27  Nevertheless, the valuation problems 
here are daunting.  How are we to determine how much consumers are willing 
to pay to avoid privacy-eroding companies?28  
Perhaps, as Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman suggest in their book Priceless, 
we should stop even trying to pretend that these decisions can be made on 
                                                     
24 See Press Release, Google Inc., Google Closes Acquisition of  DoubleClick (Mar. 11, 2008), 
available at www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080311_doubleclick.html. 
25 Both Supreme Court precedent and DOJ guidelines support this approach.  See Nat’l Soc’y 
of  Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The assumption that 
competition is the best method of  allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all 
elements of  a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate 
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at 30–32 (1997) (efficient market 
behavior is indicated by lower prices, new products, and “improved quality”).   
26 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of  
Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 529 (2004) (“[C]onsumer preferences may be heavily 
influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are produced.”). 
27 Id. at 534.   
28 Christopher Yoo has demanded this kind of  accounting in the context of  net neutrality.  See 
Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 54 (2005) (“There is 
nothing incoherent about imposing regulation to promote values other than economic 
welfare. …  [but] such a theory must provide a basis for quantifying the noneconomic 
benefits and for determining when those benefits justify the economic costs.”).  
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anything approaching a purely economic basis.29  Engaging in a cost–benefit 
analysis diminishes privacy’s status as a right.  Though many scholars have 
compellingly argued for broader foundations for competition law, the 
mainstream of contemporary antitrust policy in the United States cannot 
accommodate such concerns.  Antitrust’s summum bonum is the maximization of 
“consumer welfare,” and this measure of efficiency is notoriously narrow.30  For 
example, the DOJ was hard pressed to adequately factor in a basic democratic 
commitment to diverse communicative channels during many media mergers.31   
Given antitrust doctrine’s pronounced tendency to suppress or elide the cultural 
and political consequences of concentrated corporate power, the Bureau of 
Competition and the Bureau of Economics within the FTC are ill-equipped to 
respond to the most compelling issues raised by search engines.32  The Google–
Doubleclick merger proceedings ultimately ended with an overwhelming win 
for Google at the FTC.33  This outcome was all but inevitable given the 
foundations of contemporary antitrust doctrine,34 and is the logical outgrowth 
of overreliance on legal economic theory that uncritically privileges market 
                                                     
29 Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of  Everything and 
the Value of  Nothing 8–9 (The New Press 2004).  
30 See Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 1001 (2008) 
(observing the primacy of  allocative efficiency in antitrust analysis).  Stucke notes that 
“[b]ehind allocative efficiency’s façade of  positivism lie [many] moral questions … .”  Id.  See 
also Julie E. Cohen, Network Stories, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 92 (2007) (“What makes 
the network good can only be defined by generating richly detailed ethnographies of  the 
experiences the network enables and the activities it supports, and articulating a normative 
theory to explain what is good, and worth preserving, about those experiences and 
activities.”). 
31 See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 857 
(2002) (“[T]he dominant antitrust focus on power over pricing can be distinguished from power 
over the content available for consumer choice.  In the currently dominant paradigm, a merger that 
dramatically reduced the number of  independent suppliers of  a particular category of  
content—say, news or local news or Black activist news—creates no antitrust problem if, as 
likely, it does not lead to power to raise prices.”). 
32 See STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, FTC File No. 071-0170 (FTC Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT 
OF FTC CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK] (“Although [privacy concerns] may present 
important policy questions for the Nation, the sole purpose of  federal antitrust review of  
mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition.”). 
33 Id. 
34 Maurice Stucke describes and critiques this bias in some detail.  See Stucke, supra note 30, at 
1031 (describing a “mishmash of  neoclassical economic theory, vignettes of  zero-sum 
competition, and normative weighing of  the anticompetitive ethereal—deadweight welfare 
loss—against the conjectures of  procompetitive efficiencies” at the core of  too much 
antitrust law and theory).  Among his many important contributions to the literature, Stucke 
makes it clear that competition policy includes far more goals and tactics than antitrust 
enforcement alone.  Id. at 987–1008.  
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outcomes.35  As long as contemporary doctrine holds that antitrust is singularly 
focused on the “consumer welfare” a proposed transaction will generate,36 
antitrust policymakers will be unable to address the cultural and political 
consequences of consolidation in the search industry. 
Antitrust challenges to the proposed settlement of a copyright lawsuit by 
authors and publishers against Google’s Book Search program are likely to be 
similarly constrained.37  As in the Google-Doubleclick merger, the privacy 
implications of Google’s proposed deal with publishers are profound.38  Anyone 
who cares about public input into the future of access to knowledge should 
approach the potential deal here warily, even if the prospect of constructing a 
digital Library of Alexandria tempts scholars.39    As Harvard librarian Robert 
Darnton has argued, only a naive optimist could ignore the perils of having one 
profit-driven company effectively entrusted with a comprehensive collection of 
the world’s books.40   
When publishers challenged Google’s book scanning in 2007, many hoped that 
public interest groups could leverage copyright challenges to Google’s book 
                                                     
35 Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for “Critical Legal 
Economics,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1161 (“[T]hree of  the most basic assumptions to the 
popular [law & economics] enterprise—that people are rational, that ability to pay 
determines value, and that the common law is efficient—while couched in the metaphors of  
science, remain unsubstantiated.”).  But see JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF 
SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL–ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 164–66 
(Duke Univ. Press 2007) (describing the “notable movement to broaden the scope of  legal–
economic theory under the rubric of  socioeconomics”). 
36 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) 
(acknowledging the economic foundations of  U.S. antitrust law). 
37 Motoko Rich, Google and Authors Win Extension for Book Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at 
B3, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/technology/companies/10gbooks.html?_r=1.  The 
DOJ expressed dissatisfaction with the parties’ most recent proposed settlement, as well.  See 
Cecilia Kang, Judge Puts Off  Ruling on Google’s Proposed Digital Book Settlement, WASH. POST, Feb. 
19, 2010, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/18/AR2010021800944.html?hpid=moreheadlines.   
38 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Google Book Search Settlement and Reader Privacy, 
available at www.eff.org/issues/privacy/google-book-search-settlement (last visited 
July 11, 2010).  As author Michael Chabon argues, “if  there is no privacy of  thought — 
which includes implicitly the right to read what one wants, without the approval, consent or 
knowledge of  others — then there is no privacy, period.”   Id.   
39 See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved?  The Future of  Digital 
Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 990–91 (2007) (looking at the Google Book Search project 
as a means of  saving culture and “explor[ing] whether saving culture and saving copyright 
can be made compatible goals”).   
40 Robert Darnton, The Library in the New Age, 55 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 2008, at 39, 
available at www.nybooks.com/articles/21514. 
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search program to promote the public interest.  Courts could condition a pro-
Google fair use finding on universal access to the contents of the resulting 
database.  Landmark cases like Sony v. Universal41 set a precedent for taking such 
broad public interests into account in the course of copyright litigation.42  Those 
who opt out of the settlement may be able to fight for such concessions, but for 
now the battle centers on challenges to the settlement itself.  
Both James Grimmelmann and Pamela Samuelson have suggested several 
principles and recommendations to guide judicial deliberations on the proposed 
settlement.43  Grimmelmann’s work has focused primarily on antitrust issues,44 
while Samuelson has concentrated on the concerns of academic authors.45  
Grimmelmann has succinctly summarized the settlement’s potential threats to 
innovation and competition in the market for book indices, and books 
themselves: 
The antitrust danger here is that the settlement puts Google in 
a highly privileged position for book search and book sales. …  
The authors and publishers settled voluntarily with Google, but 
there’s no guarantee they’ll offer similar terms, or any terms at 
all, to anyone else. …  [They] could unilaterally decide only to 
talk to Google.46 
                                                     
41 Sony Corp. of  Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).   
42 Frank Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 777, 790 (2005). 
43 See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of  Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming, 2010), available at http://digital-
scholarship.org/digitalkoans/2010/01/13/google-book-search-and-the-future-of-
books-in-cyberspace/ (discussing the “six categories of  serious reservations that have 
emerged about the settlement … reflected in the hundreds of  objections and numerous 
amicus curiae briefs filed with the court responsible for determining whether to approve the 
settlement.”).   
44 See generally James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 J. INTERNET 
L., Apr. 2009, at 1 (arguing that the Google Book Search antitrust case settlement should be 
approved with additional measures designed to promote competition and protect 
consumers) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, Google Book Search Settlement].  
45 Letter from Pamela Samuelson, Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of  Law, 
University of  California, Berkeley School of  Law, to Hon. Denny Chin, Judge, S.D.N.Y. 
(Sept. 3, 2009), available at www.scribd.com/doc/19409346/Academic-Author-Letter-090309 
(urging the judge to condition “approval of  the Settlement Agreement on modification of  
various terms identified herein so that the Agreement will be fairer and more adequate 
toward academic authors.”).  
46 James Grimmelmann, In Google We Antitrust, TPMCAFÉ BOOK CLUB, Jan. 15, 2009, 
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/01/15/in_google_we_antitrust. 
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Grimmelmann proposes several methods of assuring that the publishers will 
deal with other book search services.47  Grimmelmann suggests an “[a]ntitrust 
consent decree” and “[n]ondiscrimination among copyright owners” as 
potential responses to the issues raised by the settlement.48  Most of his 
proposal reflects a policy consensus that presumes competition is the ideal 
solution to abuses of power online.49  
Yet there are many reasons why competition is unlikely to arise in book search 
services, even if the settlement is altered in order to promote it.50  Licensing 
costs are likely to be a substantial barrier to entry.  A key to competition in the 
search market is having a comprehensive database of searchable materials; the 
more these materials need to be licensed, the less likely it is that a second comer 
can set up its own book archive.  As scholars have demonstrated, deals like 
Google’s proposed settlement help entrench copyright holders’ claims for 
licensing revenue.51  Moreover, innovation in search is heavily dependent on 
having an installed base of users that effectively “train” the search engine to be 
responsive.52  The more search queries an engine gets, the better able it is to 
sharpen and perfect its algorithm.53  Each additional user tends to decrease the 
cost of a better quality service for all subsequent users by contributing activity 
that helps the search engine differentiate between high and low quality 
organizational strategies.54  Thus, incumbents with large numbers of users enjoy 
                                                     
47 Id.   
48 Grimmelmann, Google Book Search Settlement, supra note 44, at 15. 
49 Grimmelmann does also propose some revised terms that would not be primarily designed 
to incentivize the development of  new alternatives to Google Book Search; for example, he 
proposes “[l]ibrary and reader representation at the [Book Rights R]egistry” that would 
administer many aspects of  the settlement.  Id. 
50 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 5, at 1152 (“Though the market choices of  users and 
technological developments constrain search engine abuse to some extent, they are unlikely 
to vindicate [certain social] values … .”); Frank Pasquale, Seven Reasons to Doubt Competition in 
the General Search Engine Market, MADISONIAN, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://madisonian.net/2009/03/18/seven-reasons-to-doubt-competition-in-the-
general-search-engine-market. 
51 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 884 (2007) (describing how the decision as to whether to fight for fair use or license a 
copyrighted work can be difficult “because the penalties for infringement typically include 
supracompensatory damages and injunctive relief ”).  
52 James Pitkow et al., Personalized Search, 45 COMMS. ACM, Sept. 2002, at 50 (discussing 
methods of  personalizing search systems). 
53 For example, if  100 people search for “alternatives to Microsoft Word software” on a search 
engine on a given day and all pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may adjust 
itself  and put the third-ranked result as the first result the next day.  The most-used search 
engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals. 
54 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Fairness, Access, and Accountability in 
the Law of  Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1181 (2008); David A. Vise & Mark Malseed, 
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substantial advantages over smaller entrants.  Restrictive terms of service also 
deter competitors who aspire to reverse engineer and develop better versions of 
such services.55  In general purpose search, users cannot reproduce, copy, or 
resell any Google service for any reason, even if the behavior is manual and non-
disruptive.56  Another section proscribes “creat[ing] a derivative work of … the 
Software.”57  Advertisers face other restrictions, as Google’s AdWords 
Application Programming Interface (API) Terms & Conditions “impede 
advertisers’ efforts to efficiently copy their ad campaigns to other providers.”58  
All of these factors militate against robust competition in the comprehensive 
book search field.   
Quantum leaps in technology capable of overcoming these brute disadvantages 
are unlikely, particularly because search is as much about personalized service as 
it is about technical principles of information organization and retrieval.59  
Current advantage in search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially given that 
so many more people are using the services now than when Google overtook 
other search engines in the early 2000s.60 
What does an online world featuring an entrenched Google Book Search as 
gatekeeper look like?  Initially, it will prove a vast improvement on the status 
                                                                                                                             
The Google Story 215 (2005) (noting that the most-used search engine will have more data 
to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals. ).  ( 
55 Though the precise terms of  service of  Google Book Search have not been finalized, 
Google’s more general terms of  service are not promising.  Google’s terms of  service 
prohibit any action that “interferes with or disrupts” Google’s services, networks, or 
computers.  Google Inc., Terms of  Service § 5.4 (Apr. 16, 2007), 
www.google.com/accounts/TOS.  Repeated queries to the service necessary to gather data 
on its operations may well violate these terms. 
56 Id. § 5.5.  
57 Id. § 10.2.  Section 5.3 would proscribe both the automatic data collection and the use of  a 
nonapproved “interface” for accessing Google’s database, regardless of  the exact means.  Id. 
§ 5.3. 
58 Ben Edelman, PPC Platform Competition and Google’s ‘May Not Copy’ Restriction, June 27, 2008, 
http://www.benedelman.org/news/062708-1.html (arguing that “Google’s restrictions 
on export and copying of  advertisers’ campaigns … hinder competition in Internet 
advertising”).  Though the hearing at which Professor Edelman was to testify was cancelled, 
he has documented these problems in some detail at his website, www.benedelman.org.  
59 John Battelle, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF 
BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 8 (2005).at 8 (describing how personalized 
search enhances the value of  search engines to both users and advertisers).  Due to trade 
secrecy, it is impossible for policymakers to discover how much of  the intermediary’s success 
is due to its employees’ inventive genius, and how much is due to the collective contributions 
of  millions of  users to the training of  the intermediary’s computers. 
60 See Randall Stross, Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything 
We Know 98 (Free Press 2008) (describing success of  YouTube, a subsidiary of  Google). 
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quo of bulky, hard-to-acquire, physical copies of books.  But when we consider 
the ways in which knowledge can be rationed for profit, or structured to 
promote political ends, some worries arise.  Google plans to monetize the book 
search corpus, and one predictable way of increasing its value is to make parts 
of it unavailable to those unwilling to pay high licensing fees.  If the settlement 
allowed Google to charge such fees in an unconstrained manner, unmoored 
from the underlying costs of operating the project, the company would 
essentially be exploiting a public easement (to copy books) for unlimited private 
gain.61  The Open Content Alliance has questioned the restrictive terms of the 
contracts that Google strikes when it agrees to scan and create a digital database 
of a library’s books.62  Those restrictive terms foreshadow potential future 
restrictions on book search services.  The proposed deal raises fundamental 
questions about the proper scope of private initiative in organizing and 
rationing access to knowledge.  
Well-funded libraries may pay a premium to gain access to all sources; lesser 
institutions may be granted inferior access.  If permitted to become prevalent, 
such tiered access to information could rigidify and reinforce existing 
inequalities in access to knowledge.63  Information tiering inequitably 
disadvantages many groups, promoting the leveraging of wealth into status, 
educational, or other occupational advantage.  Information is not only 
intrinsically valuable, but also can be a positional good, useful for scoring 
advantages over others.64  
                                                     
61 Writers’ Reps and Richard A. Epstein Objection filed with the Southern District of New 
York in re Google Book Search, available at 
http://www.writersreps.com/feature.aspx?FeatureID=172  (arguing that the Google 
Book Search Settlement “would accomplish[] orphan legislation—but just for Google. …  If  
[Google] is to be handed exclusive possession after stealing the scans to begin with, then it 
should be required to share those scans.”).   
62 See Open Content Alliance, Let’s Not Settle for This Settlement, 
www.opencontentalliance.org/2008/11/05/lets-not-settle-for-this-settlement (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2010) (“At its heart, the settlement agreement grants Google an effective monopoly 
on an entirely new commercial model for accessing books.  It re-conceives reading as a 
billable event.  This reading event is therefore controllable and trackable.  It also forces 
libraries into financing a vending service that requires they perpetually buy back what they 
have already paid for over many years of  careful collection.”). 
63 Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 607, 608 (2007) 
(explaining how “much technology is used not just simply to improve its user’s life, but also 
to help its user gain advantage over others”).  For example, “[t]est-preparation technologies 
… creat[e] inequalities; students able to afford test-preparation courses, such as those 
offered by Kaplan, have a definite advantage over those who do not have access to such 
courses.”  Id. at 615 (internal citation omitted).   
64 Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471, 472 
(2006) (“[Positional goods] are goods with the property that one’s relative place in the 
distribution of  the good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value.  The very 
fact that one is worse off  than others with respect to a positional good means that one is 
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Admittedly, Google Book Search has so far proven a great resource for 
scholars.  It has made “book learning accessible on a new, worldwide scale, 
despite the great digital divide that separates the poor from the 
computerized.”65  Current access to knowledge is stratified in many troubling 
ways; the works of John Willinsky66 and Peter Suber67 identify many troubling 
current forms of tiering that pale before the present impact of Google Book 
Search.68  Given the aggressive pricing strategies of many publishers and 
content owners, Google Book Search is a vital alternative for scholars.  
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee in the current version of the settlement that 
Google Book Search will preserve its public-regarding features.69  It may well 
end up like the powerful “group purchasing organizations” in the American 
health care system that started promisingly, but have evolved to exploit their 
intermediary role in troubling ways.70  Google is more than just one among 
many online service providers jostling for a competitive edge on the web.  It is 
likely to be the key private entity capable of competing or cooperating with 
academic publishers and other content providers.  Dedicated monitoring and 
regulation of the settlement terms now could help ensure that book digitization 
                                                                                                                             
worse off, in some respect, than one would be if  that good were distributed equally.  So 
while it might indeed be perverse to advocate leveling down all things considered, leveling 
down with respect to positional goods benefits absolutely, in some respect, those who would 
otherwise have less than others.   
65 Darnton, supra note 40, at 76. 
66 JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 5 (The MIT Press 2005) (describing extreme “digital divide” between those 
most connected to information resources and those cut off  from them).   
67 See generally Peter Suber, Open Access News, www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/fosblog.html.  
Suber is a leader of  the open access movement, which aims to “[p]ut[] peer-reviewed 
scientific and scholarly literature on the internet[,] [m]ak[e] it available free of  charge and 
free of  most copyright and licensing restrictions[,] [and] remov[e] the barriers to serious 
research.”  Id. 
68 See id. (chronicling on a daily basis news and controversies related to open access to scholarly 
materials on the Internet).  
69 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Baidu.com Accused of  Rigging Search, The Googlization of  Everything, 
Global Google, Jan. 2009,  
http://www.googlizationofeverything.com/2009/01/baiducom_accused_of_rigging
_se.php (Feb. 19, 2009, 14:20 EST) (“‘Public failure’ [is a] phenomenon in which a private 
firm steps into a vacuum created by incompetent or gutted public institutions.  A firm does 
this not for immediate rent seeking or even revenue generation.  It does so to enhance 
presence, reputation, or to build a platform on which to generate revenue later or elsewhere.  
It’s the opposite of  ‘market failure.’  And it explains a lot of  what Google does.”). 
70 For background on group purchasing organizations, see S. PRAKASH SETHI, GROUP 
PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE 
INDUSTRY 122 (Palgrave MacMillan 2009) (“The benefits of  combined purchases would be 
greatly reduced in conditions where the middlemen … control the entire process through 
restrictive arrangements with suppliers and customers.”).   
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protects privacy, diverse stakeholder interests, and fair pricing of access to 
knowledge.  Alliances between Google Book Search and publishers deserve 
public scrutiny because they permit private parties to take on what have often 
been public functions of determining access to and pricing of information.  
Where “regulatory copyright”71 has answered such questions with compulsory 
licenses,72 the new alliances aspire to put into place a regime of cross-
subsidization resistant to public scrutiny or input.73  Given the vital public 
interests at stake in the development of this information infrastructure, 
monitoring is vital.74  Extant law provides little assurance that it will actually 
occur. 
A Public Alternative? 
In other work, I have proposed a number of regulations that would permit 
either government or public accountability groups to monitor search engines to 
detect abuses of their dominant position.  To conclude this piece, I would like 
to raise one other alternative: a publicly funded search engine. 
To the extent that search engines resist monitoring and accountability, 
governments should consider establishing public alternatives to them.  Here, 
lessons from recent debates over health insurance may be instructive.   There 
are structural parallels between the intermediary role of private health insurers 
(which stand as a gatekeeper between patients and providers of health products 
and services) and that of search engines (which stand between searchers and 
                                                     
71 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 91 (2004) (describing the growth 
and scope of  compulsory licensing statutes that provide for compensation for copyright 
holders while denying them the right to veto particular uses of  their work).   
72 Marybeth Peters, the U.S. Register of  Copyrights, has objected to the proposed Google 
Books Settlement on the grounds that it would violate traditional norms of  separation of  
powers in copyright policy.  See Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: The 
Proposed Google Book Settlement Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of  Marybeth Peters, Register of  Copyrights), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Peters090910.pdf, at 2 (“In the view of  the 
Copyright Office, the settlement proposed by the parties would encroach on responsibility 
for copyright policy that traditionally has been the domain of  Congress. …  We are greatly 
concerned by the parties’ end run around legislative process and prerogatives, and we submit 
that this Committee should be equally concerned.”).   
73 Google considers its pricing and ranking decisions a closely held trade secret—an assertion 
that would seem very strange if  it came from a public library.  See Pamela Samuelson, Google 
Books Is Not a Library, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2009, 
www.huffingtonpost.com/pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-
lib_b_317518.html (“Libraries everywhere are terrified that Google will engage in price-
gouging when setting prices for institutional subscriptions to [Google Book Search] 
contents.”).   
74 Frank Pasquale, Beyond Competition and Innovation: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet 
Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 105 (2010) (offering proposals for monitoring internet 
intermediaries).  
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providers of information).  The 1965 decision to establish Medicare as a public 
option for an elderly population ill-served by private providers and insurers may 
prove a model for an information economy plagued by persistent digital divides. 
As the United States debated health reform from 2009 to 2010, there was a 
tension between regulation-focused approaches (which would require revelation 
and alteration of private insurers’ unfair practices) and a public option that 
would compete with existing insurers.  Democrats ultimately gave up on 
pushing the public option, but the debate exposed the many positive aspects a 
state-sponsored alternative can provide in certain markets.  A public option 
could play a role in search parallel to the role that Medicare plays in the health 
system: guaranteeing some baseline of transparency in pricing and evaluation.75    
The recent Google Book Search settlement negotiations have led Siva 
Vaidhyanathan to characterize Google’s archive project as evidence of a “public 
failure.”76  Whereas government intervention is often necessary in cases of 
“market failure,” Vaidhyanathan argues that the reverse can occur: market 
actors can step into a vacuum where government should have been.  In the case 
of digitized books, the problem is presented starkly: Why has the Library of 
Congress failed to require digital deposit of books, instead of merely accepting 
paper copies?  We can debate when such a requirement became plausible; 
however, had the government required such deposit as soon as it became 
feasible, the problematic possibility of a Google monopoly here would be much 
less troubling.  If digital deposit ever is adopted, the government could license 
its corpus to alternative search services.  There is no good reason why the 
company that is best capable of reproducing books (and settling lawsuits based 
on that reproduction) should have a monopoly on search technologies used to 
organize and distribute them.   
More ambitiously, an NGO or quasi-administrative NGO could undertake to 
index and archive the web, licensing opportunities to search and organize it to 
various entities that promise to maintain open standards for ranking and rating 
websites and other Internet presences.77  Wikipedia, Slashdot, and eBay all 
                                                     
75 For more on the role of  public options like Medicare in the modern medical sector, see Frank 
Pasquale, Making the Case for the Public Plan, Part II: Public Option as Private Benchmark, July 15, 
2009, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/making-case-for-public-plan-
part-ii.html. 
76 Vaidhyanathan, supra note 69. (“ ‘Public failure’ [is a] phenomenon in which a private firm 
steps into a vacuum created by incompetent or gutted public institutions.  A firm does this 
not for immediate rent seeking or even revenue generation.  It does so to enhance presence, 
reputation, or to build a platform on which to generate revenue later or elsewhere.  It’s the 
opposite of  ‘market failure.’  And it explains a lot of  what Google does.”).   
77 For a cultural case for government intervention here, see Mário J. Silva, The Case for a 
Portuguese Web Search Engine, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBUQFjAA&url=htt
p%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.106.
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suggest methods of evaluating relevance and authority that could be employed 
by public, open search engines.  If such a search engine became at least 
somewhat popular (or popular within a given niche), it could provide an 
important alternative source of information and metadata on ranking processes. 
The need for a public option in search becomes even more apparent when we 
consider the waste and inefficiency caused by opaque intermediaries in other 
fields.  Like private health insurers, Google is a middleman, standing between 
consumers and producers of knowledge.  In programs like Book Search, it will 
effectively collaborate with copyright owners to determine what access people 
get, how much they have to pay, and on what terms.  In the health field, 
providers and private insurers are both very concentrated in the U.S., and 
consumers (i.e., the businesses and individuals who buy insurance plans) are not. 
Insurers and providers also jealously guard the secrecy of many pricing 
decisions.78  That is one key reason why the U.S. spends so much more on 
health care than other industrialized nations, without getting consistently better 
results, access, or quality. 
Health care reformers often split into two camps: those who believe that 
regulation of middlemen like insurers can bring about fair results, and those 
who believe that only a public option can serve as a benchmark for judging the 
behavior of private insurers. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) of 2010 decisively opted for the regulatory option, and the early stages 
of its implementation have been rocky.  The constitutional challenges to search 
engine regulation would likely prove more serious than the many lawsuits now 
attacking PPACA.  Therefore, even if the public option in health care is off the 
table now, it should inspire future proposals in information policy, where 
regulation of intermediaries may be even more difficult than it has proven to be 
in health care.  If search engines consistently block or frustrate measures to 
increase their accountability, public alternatives could prove to be an 
indispensable foundation of a fair, just, and open information environment. 
                                                                                                                             
5334%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=IWZYTJbaCoKC8gapvY2xCw&usg=AFQ
jCNHdTPpTBUuNHZhTOZtGaRiVKP6C4g&sig2=9aoaKLXiXOOUuYHMewopV
Q (describing the value of  a Portuguese-oriented search engine); JEAN NOEL JENNENY, 
GOOGLE AND THE MYTH OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE: A VIEW FROM EUROPE (Univ. of  
Chicago Press 2007).  Whereas these authors believe that English-language bias is a 
particularly problematic aspect of  Google’s hegemony in the field, I argue that the possibility 
of  many kinds of  hidden bias counsel in favor of  at least one robust, publicly funded 
alternative. 
78 See, e.g., Uwe Reinhart, The Pricing of  U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of  Secrecy, at 
http://healthaff.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/1/57; Annemarie Bridy, Trade 
Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device Manufacturers are Seeking to Sustain Profits by 
Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187 (2009) (discussing “recent claims by the 
medical device manufacturer Guidant that the actual prices its hospital customers pay for 
implantable devices, including cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators, are protectable as trade 
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”).    
